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Abstract When testing primates with cognitive tasks, it
is usually not considered that subjects differ markedly in
terms of emotional reactivity toward the experimenter,
which potentially affects a subject’s cognitive perfor-
mance. We addressed this issue in common marmosets
(Callithrix jacchus), a monkey species in which males tend
to show stronger emotional reactivity in testing situations,
whereas females have been reported to outperform males in
cognitive tasks. In a two-phase experiment, we first quan-
tified the emotional reactivity of 14 subjects toward four
different experimenters performing a standardized behav-
ioral action sequence and then assessed whether and how it
affected the subjects’ participation and performance in a
subsequent object permanence task. A test session was
terminated if a subject refused to make a choice in four
consecutive trials. Highly emotionally aroused individuals,
particularly males, were less likely to participate in the
cognitive task and completed fewer trials. However,
whenever they did participate and were attentive to the
task, their performance was not affected. Our results sug-
gest that differences in emotional reactivity toward an
experimenter have no major impact on cognitive perfor-
mance if strict criteria are applied on when to abandon a
test session and if performance is corrected for attention to
the test procedure. Furthermore, they suggest that the
reported sex differences in cognitive performance in mar-
mosets may be owing to motivational and attentional fac-
tors, rather than a difference in cognitive ability per se.
Keywords Emotional reactivity  Common marmosets 
Experimenter effects  Sex differences in cognitive
performance
Introduction
Whenever researchers conduct experiments with human or
non-human primates, there is a risk that they will unin-
tentionally influence the study’s outcome in one or several
ways. Consequently, the study subjects might change their
behavior in response to the experimenter rather than the
experimental conditions. In order to avoid experimenter
effects and to optimize comparability of results, different
experimenters are usually trained to use identical stan-
dardized procedures. But can we ever be certain that dif-
ferent experimenters conducting the same test with the
same subjects reliably obtain the same results in terms of
the subjects’ cognitive performance scores? One possibility
is that different experimenters may elicit different emo-
tional reactions in the subjects. In particular, some subjects
may feel more at ease or more nervous with a specific
experimenter than others. Such individual differences in
emotional reactivity may influence a subject’s motivation
to participate in a cognitive test with this experimenter,
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and, importantly, this lower motivation in turn may affect
its cognitive performance.
Possible effects of experimenters on subjects’ perfor-
mance scores in cognitive studies have been extensively
studied in humans, and rodents, but only rarely been
addressed systematically in non-human primates. The
numerous reports of experimenter effects on the cognitive
performance of human subjects include experimenters
forming personal expectations on how different subjects
might perform (e.g., Rosenthal 1963) or differences in the
way experimenters interact with their subjects such as
being friendly or neutral (e.g., Siegwarth et al. 2012). In
studies with rats, biases such as an experimenter’s expec-
tation regarding a subject’s cognitive abilities or the degree
of familiarity between the experimenter and the subject
have been shown to potentially affect a subject’s perfor-
mance (see Schellinck et al. 2010). Systematic investiga-
tions of experimenter effects in non-human primates are
rare and include two studies on capuchin monkeys, an
observational field study on the putative effects of the
presence of a human observer on the subjects’ movement
and activity patterns (Crofoot et al. 2010) and an experi-
mental study that suggested experimenters may bias the
results of cognitive tests by selectively choosing subjects
with homogenous personality traits (Morton et al. 2013).
Crofoot et al. (2010) analyzed the movement and
activity patterns (recorded via telemetric collars) of seven
habituated capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella) in the pre-
sence and absence of a human researcher. Overall, the
capuchins did not change their movement and activity
patterns in the presence of a human researcher. More subtle
behavioral differences, however, could not be measured,
such as the relative frequency of particular activities (e.g.,
vigilance, distress or resting behavior) and whether indi-
viduals differ systematically in such responses to the pre-
sence of a human researcher.
Morton et al. (2013) analyzed whether the outcome of
cognitive tests in captivity is affected by the so-called
personality selection bias. In captive experiments,
researchers can control for most confounding variables by
careful study design. However, researchers may tend to
selectively choose their study subjects based on particular
personality traits, such as openness. This selection bias
may ultimately result in a performance bias if such a per-
sonality trait is linked to cognitive performance. Morton
and colleagues rated capuchin monkeys (S. apella) on five
personality dimensions and analyzed their participation
(how many sessions they completed) and performance
(how fast they learned to choose correctly) in two training
tasks. In the first task, food was positioned in front of one
of the two test compartments that the monkeys could freely
access, and a correct response was to sit in the compart-
ment that had the food in front of it. In the second task, a
small opaque cup was placed in front of one compartment
and a larger opaque cup in front of the other one, and a
correct response was to sit in the compartment that had the
larger cup in front of it. The authors found that individuals
scoring higher on openness were more likely to participate
and performed better in the first task, and assertiveness
affected the monkeys’ performance in both tasks, with less
assertive subjects performing better than more assertive
ones. Arguably, only the second task measured a truly
cognitive component, and it is in this task that an indi-
vidual’s openness score no longer had an effect on its
performance score. The negative effect of assertiveness
may be best understood as individuals having motivational
priorities others than food. A direct link between person-
ality traits and cognitive ability per se could thus not be
demonstrated unambiguously.
A study on rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta, Toxop-
eus et al. 2005), however, showed that high levels on one
dimension of trait anxiety, as assessed behaviorally in the
group context in response to a loud noise, negatively
impacted performance in a learning test. This result may
suggest a link between one of the three dimensions of trait
anxiety and cognitive performance, but, as the authors
stress, highly anxious subjects could simply be less atten-
tive to the test than less anxious subjects, rather than
having genuinely lower cognitive abilities. This argument
is particularly convincing since anxiety was also linked
with low status: Subordinate individuals may be less
attentive to the task simply because they have to constantly
monitor dominant conspecifics. In order to disentangle
such confounding effects from genuine cognitive ability, it
is necessary to control cognitive performance with regard
to whether the subjects were attentive to the test procedure
in the first place or not.
Importantly, excluding subjects from participation in
cognitive tests is problematic, regardless of whether
exclusions target individuals of a specific personality type,
to the extent that they differ systematically in genuine
cognitive performance. But even in the absence of such
sampling biases, the risk of indirect and subtle experi-
menter influences on the subjects’ performance remains.
According to the Yerkes–Dodson law (Yerkes and Dodson
1908), an individual performs best in a cognitive task if its
emotional arousal is at an optimal level, which tends to be a
medium degree of arousal. This optimal arousal level may
vary both between and within individuals. While person-
ality and trait anxiety may to some extent explain the origin
of arousal level differences between individuals, an indi-
vidual’s emotional arousal levels also may vary from one
cognitive task to the other, either as a consequence of task
difficulty or a variety of other causes. Therefore, it is
essential that the experimenter is aware of individual dif-
ferences in the subjects’ emotional reactivity and their
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possible consequences on the subjects’ motivation, atten-
tion and cognitive performance. Ideally, a subject’s
behavioral signs of emotional arousal are evaluated prior to
and during cognitive testing. The aim of our study was to
systematically assess these issues in common marmoset
monkeys (Callithrix jacchus).
Marmosets belong to the primates smallest in body size
(Ford et al. 2009), which arguably makes them particularly
likely to show high emotional reactivity toward human
experimenters owing to the body size difference between
experimenter and subject. Furthermore, reported and
observed sex differences make them a particularly inter-
esting study species to investigate the effect of emotional
reactivity toward the experimenter on their participation
and performance in cognitive tasks. In the wild, male
marmosets are more vigilant than females (Koenig 1998),
and in captivity, they seem to be more easily emotionally
aroused during cognitive testing (personal observation).
Emotionally aroused males often appear less willing to
participate in a full test session or less attentive to the
experimental stimuli when they do so. Intriguingly, male
marmosets have also been reported to perform more poorly
in cognitive tasks than females (Brown et al. 2010; Ya-
mamoto et al. 2004). They thus represent an ideal test case
to identify whether their poor performance simply reflects
emotional reactivity, a lack of motivation and attention or a
true sex difference in cognitive ability. Yamamoto et al.
(2004) tested female and male marmosets with a cognitive
task that required the subjects to open an opaque plastic
container by piercing its lid in order to obtain a raisin that
they could see through a small hole in the lid. Male mar-
mosets needed more time to approach and solve this task
and used fewer strategies to obtain the reward. Brown et al.
(2010) tested female and male marmosets’ capacity to
perceive biological motion by presenting them with point-
light patterns of a walking hen on a computer screen. They
found that female subjects paid more attention to the bio-
logical motion stimuli than males and spent more time
inspecting them. The results of both above-mentioned
studies were interpreted as a sex differences in marmosets’
cognitive abilities. However, an alternative explanation is
that the poor performance of male marmosets found in these
studies was an artifact of a lower motivation (e.g., to work
for food) or lower attention resulting from higher emotional
arousal in the test situation.
The aim of our study was to systematically assess indi-
vidual differences in the subjects’ spontaneous behavioral
response to an experimental situation and their potential
effect on their participation and performance in a cognitive
task. In a two-phase experiment conducted in a single ses-
sion, we quantified behavioral and bodily indicators of
elevated emotional reactivity when marmosets were con-
fronted with different experimenters and investigated
whether variation in emotional reactivity toward an exper-
imenter influenced the subjects’ motivation to participate
and their performance in a commonly used cognitive task.
In the first phase, an experimenter performed a stan-
dardized sequence of behavioral actions in front of the
individual subject. This sequence consisted of the experi-
menter entering the room, performing a succession of six
standardized actions, leaving and reentering the room and
finally offering a highly desirable reward to the subject. In
the second phase, the same experimenter conducted an
object permanence task with the subject, composed of a
visible and an invisible displacement condition of six trials
each. In order to maximize variation in emotional reac-
tivity, we used different experimenters that were either
familiar women (whom we expected to elicit low levels of
emotional arousal) or unfamiliar men (whom we expected
to elicit high levels of emotional arousal).
We addressed three main questions: (1) Do individual
subjects react differently to different experimenters in
terms of emotional arousal? (2) Are subjects with a
stronger emotional response to an experimenter less willing
to participate in a cognitive test? (3) Do subjects with a
stronger emotional response toward an experimenter per-
form worse in a cognitive task given they participate?
We expected to find substantial variation in the subjects’
emotional reactivity and that male marmosets would react
more strongly, particularly in response to unfamiliar
experimenters. Furthermore, we anticipated that high
emotional reactivity would lead to low participation,
whereas we had no prediction on whether high emotional
reactivity would be linked to cognitive performance given
we controlled for attention to the test stimuli and their
manipulation. If males show higher emotional reactivity
and lower participation as well as lower performance, even
after controlling for attention, this would suggest genuine
sex differences in cognitive ability. If, however, they
showed higher reactivity, lower participation, but no dif-
ference in cognitive performance after controlling for
attention, this would suggest that sex differences in cog-
nitive performance are driven by motivational and atten-
tional factors, rather than cognitive ability per se.
Materials and methods
Subjects
Study subjects were 14 adult captive common marmosets
(C. jacchus) of equal sex distribution, with a mean age of
7.11 years, living in family groups at the Primate Station of
the Anthropological Institute of the University of Zurich.
All marmosets were captive-born and mother-reared and
participated in this study on four mornings after being fed
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their regular breakfast meal, a vitamin and calcium-enri-
ched porridge. For a description of the study sample, see
Table 1.
Experimenters
To maximize variation in the marmosets’ emotional reac-
tivity, we used four different human experimenters: two
familiar women whom we expected to elicit low emotional
arousal and two unfamiliar men whom we expected to elicit
high emotional arousal based on our experience with the
study species (similar effects have recently been reported for
rodents by Sorge et al. 2014). The marmosets had never seen
the unfamiliar experimenters before this study but regularly
participated in other studies with the familiar experimenters
for at least a year. Note that the aim of this study was not to
identify why marmosets react more strongly to some
experimenters than others, i.e., to disentangle the effect of
the experimenters’ familiarity or gender on marmosets’
emotional reactivity, which would have required counter-
balancing the two factors. Rather, we were interested in the
consequences of high emotional reactivity, regardless of its
origin, for the marmosets’ participation and performance in
a subsequent cognitive task. Consequently, we chose
experimenters whom we anticipated to produce the highest
variation in the subjects’ emotional reactivity. All four
experimenters wore indiscernible black clothes and, most
importantly, featureless black shoes as marmosets, an
arboreal New World monkey species, tend to react strongly
to obtrusive features at ground level (unpublished data).
Experimental setup
All marmosets were tested individually in the same
familiar experimental room and cage in which they had
previously been tested in several socio-cognitive experi-
ments (e.g., Burkart et al. 2007, 2009). The experimental
cage contained the actual test compartment
(41 9 33 9 53 cm) and a directly connected second
compartment of the same size. The two compartments were
divided by a grid wall containing a rectangular opening
(15 9 22.5 cm) in its bottom half through which the sub-
ject could move away from the experimenter and testing
table and closer to its group members. We thereby ensured
that very highly aroused subjects did not feel restricted in
space. Each subject was tested individually in the same test
compartment while its group members were waiting in an
adjacent cage (100 9 78 9 122 cm). This waiting cage
was connected to the experimental cage through a short
gateway. Its lateral wall facing the experimental enclosure
was covered with an opaque gray plastic board and its front
with an opaque cream-colored fabric blind. This setup
prevented the waiting subjects from seeing the experi-
menter until it was their turn to enter the test compartment
while still allowing the current subject to hear and smell,
but not see, its group members. Having such minimal
‘‘contact’’ with group members is essential for marmosets’
welfare as complete isolation from conspecifics imposes
distress on this highly social species. Both cages were
elevated 1.15 m from the ground as marmosets are arboreal
and thus appear more comfortable in higher positions.
Apparatus
The basic experimental apparatus consisted of a testing
table, a wooden board (40 9 40 cm) with two lateral
plastic rails that was mounted on an adjustable tripod table
so that the board’s front was flush with the front of the
experimental compartment. The wooden board of the
testing table served as a base for the experimental equip-
ment during the experimenter’s behavioral action sequence
(phase 1) and for the sliding platform and the cups during
the cognitive task (phase 2). The equipment for the
experimenter’s behavioral action sequence consisted of
two transparent glass containers (6 9 3 cm) with white
plastic lids, one of which was half-filled with fine-grained
pet sand, as well as of a digital timer and a dead cricket
(Acheta domesticus; about 12 mm in size). The cognitive
test apparatus itself consisted of a rectangular sliding
platform (33.7 9 25 cm) made of cardboard that was
covered with a washable wood-patterned plastic surface
and three cylindrical opaque black plastic cups
(3.8 9 2.6 cm). The three aligned cups were placed at a
distance of 3 cm from the platform’s front edge, and the
distance between the middle and each outer cup was
10 cm. All three cups were initially openly placed on the
sliding board and kept in place with double-sided adhesive
pads attached to the side that was lying on the board.
Table 1 Description of the
study sample
Listed are the 14 subjects’
name, sex (seven females and
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Experimental procedure
The experimental procedure consisted of two consecutive
phases conducted in a single session with a maximal
total duration of approximately 15 min that mainly
depended on whether and how long an individual subject
participated in the cognitive task. We used a within-
subject design, where each of the four experimenters
performed the two-phase experiment with all subjects. In
phase 1, the experimenter (hereafter E) performed a
series of six standardized behavioral actions in front of
the subject that each lasted 30 s. In phase 2, the E
conducted a short object permanence task with the same
subject. This resulted in 56 experimenter–subject dyads.
Both phases, the standardized behavioral action sequence
and the object permanence task, were identical for all
subject–experimenter pairs. Experimenter order was
counterbalanced across subjects to control for order
effects. The two phases of the experiment are shown in
Fig. 1.
Phase 1: the standardized behavioral action sequence
of the experimenter
The E entered the room, called the subject’s name,
walked toward the experimental cage on a marked line on
the floor while looking down to this line and stopped
50 cm in front of the testing compartment, leaving the
testing table between the E and the subject. The E then
performed a standardized sequence of six behavioral
actions, each lasting 30 s. A digital timer beeped to
indicate when a 30-s interval had ended. For each action
of the behavioral sequence, the E retrieved the equipment
from a storage table at the back wall of the room and
replaced it onto this storage table before starting the next
action.
The experimenters’ six sequential actions
1. Standing still The E stood in front of the subject’s test
compartment. The E’s body, head and eyes were
facing 90 away from the subject, while the arms were
in a neutrally stretched position on the sides of the E’s
body. After 30 s, the E turned toward the subject and
began with the second action.
2. Establishing eye contact The E was now facing the
subject and tried to establish eye contact for 30 s by
following the subject with head and eye gaze.
3. Manipulation of an unfamiliar object The E took the
two small transparent containers (one was filled with
sand and the other was empty) and placed them on the
testing table. The E started the timer and removed the
containers’ lids, subsequently lifted up the containers,
one in each hand, and visibly poured the sand from one
container into the other and vice versa as soon as the
first container was empty. The E repeated pouring the
sand between the two containers, until 30 s had
elapsed, closed the lids again and placed the containers
back onto the storage table.
4. Holding food After taking a cricket from the storage
table, the E again stood in front of the testing table, as
in the previous sequence, started the timer and held up
the cricket visibly about 25 cm in front of E’s chest
without offering it to the subject. While doing so, the E
was facing the digital timer on the apparatus for 30 s.
5. Placing food out of reach/E present The E laid down
the previously held cricket onto the wooden platform
at a distance of 17 cm (which is just out of the
subject’s reach) from the front of the test compartment
and looked at the cricket for 30 s while standing still.
6. Placing food out of reach/E absent The E left the room
while the cricket remained placed on the wooden
platform and out of the subject’s reach. After the 30-s
interval had elapsed, E reentered the room, picked up
Fig. 1 The two consecutive phases of the experiment. In phase 1, the
experimenter (E) performed a sequence of six behavioral actions in
front of the subject: (1) standing perpendicularly to it with head and
eyes oriented away, (2) looking at the subject while oriented toward it
and establishing eye contact, (3) manipulating an object (pouring sand
between two transparent containers), (4) holding up a cricket (out of
reach), (5) placing the cricket onto the test table/board (out of reach)
and (6) leaving the test room (cricket still out of reach), reentering it
and giving the cricket to the subject. In phase 2, the E conducted a
cognitive task with the subject that consisted of two short object
permanence tests of six trials each. In the first test, E placed the
cricket under one of the three cups and closed all cups. In the second
test, E again placed the cricket under one cup but then exchanged its
location with an adjacent one. The subject made its choice by
touching or lifting one of the cups
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the out-of-reach cricket from the wooden board/test
table and offered it to the subject.
Phase 2: object permanence task
Immediately after completing the behavioral action
sequence, the E conducted a short object permanence task
with the subject, consisting of two tests of six trials each,
(1) a visible displacement test and (2) an invisible dis-
placement test. The procedure corresponded principally to
the one used by Mendes and Huber (2004) who found
considerable individual variation in marmosets’ perfor-
mance. In the visible displacement test, the E placed the
reward twice under each of the three cups in a counter-
balanced manner. In the invisible displacement test and in
contrast to Mendes and Huber, we did not use a transport
cup and ensured that, at the time of the subject’s choice, the
reward appeared equally often in each location, twice on
the left (A), twice in the middle (B) and twice on the right
(C). To enhance comparability, all subjects first received
six trials of the simpler test, the visible displacement. The
invisible displacement test also consisted of six trials and
followed immediately afterwards.
Task procedure The E started the testing session by first
placing the sliding platform with the three open black cups
onto the test table. The E then called the subject’s name,
showed it a cricket, placed it in front of one of the open
cups and closed the cups from left to right.
Test 1: visible displacement In the visible displacement
test, directly after baiting, the E slid the platform toward
the test compartment so that the subject was able to make
its choice by touching or lifting one of the cups.
Test 2: invisible displacement In the invisible displace-
ment condition, the E baited one cup in the same way as in
the visible displacement condition but performed a trans-
position immediately after closing all cups. The transpo-
sition consisted in the E exchanging the location of two
cups, the baited and an adjacent empty one by simulta-
neously moving them on the board from one location to the
other using the index and middle fingers of both hands.
This resulted in the E’s hands crossing, whereby the hand
moving the baited container was always in the front. As in
the visible displacement condition, E then slid the platform
toward the test compartment and allowed the subject to
make its choice.
For both the visible and the invisible displacement tests,
a choice was defined as the first cup the subject either lifted
or touched. The procedure following the subject’s choice
was identical for both tests. If the subject correctly chose
the baited cup, it obtained the cricket reward and the next
trial started immediately. If the subject chose the wrong
cup, the E drew back the platform, showed the subject the
wrongly chosen container was empty and then opened the
other two cups from left to right. The E then retrieved the
cricket, placed it on the storage table, and continued with
the next trial after a 15-s time delay. If the subject refused
to make a choice in a given trial within 30 s, the platform
was also retrieved but no such time out imposed. The next
trial was directly started instead, and the no-choice trial
was repeated once all six trials of the test had been con-
ducted, e.g., after the sixth trial of the visible displacement
test.
Crucially, clear stop criteria were applied on when to
terminate a test session. Testing was discontinued if a
subject refused to choose any cup in four consecutive trials
or if a subject did no longer make a choice in the last three
trials of the invisible displacement test. This procedure
ensured that subjects were allowed to leave the test situa-
tion if they were highly emotionally aroused, refused to
make any choices or stopped choosing during the test
session and thus appeared unmotivated. Therefore, while
all subjects were presented with at least four of the six trials
in the first test (visible displacement), not all subjects
entered the second test (invisible displacement).
Data recording and analysis
Both phases of the experiment, the behavioral action
sequence of the E and the cognitive task, were video-
recorded continuously with a digital camera. The subjects’
spontaneous emotional response in the first phase was
coded and analyzed continuously from video recordings
using the software package Interact from Mangold. Coding
of phase 1 started as soon as the E started the digital timer
and ended as soon as the subject had retrieved the cricket
from the E’s hand.
Dependent measures during phase 1
In order to assess the extent of emotional reactivity in the
subjects, we used several visible and audible behavioral
indicators of emotional arousal usually shown by marmo-
sets in stressful or challenging situations. We expected
these indicators of emotional reactivity to be more pro-
nounced with the unfamiliar than the familiar
experimenters.
Behavioral indicators of arousal
1. Tail-brush
In common marmosets, piloerection is most clearly visible
in the brushing of the tail. A brushed tail indicates general
vegetative arousal, but not necessarily of negative valence
(Dettling et al. 2002).
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2. ‘‘Tsik’’ vocalizations
Tsik vocalizations are mobbing calls that marmosets
typically emit in response to unfamiliar humans, stressful
noises, other marmoset groups and potential predators
(Martins Bezerra and Souto 2008).
3. ‘‘Egg’’ vocalizations
Egg vocalizations have been described as vigilance calls
and are usually uttered if an unfamiliar human is
approaching or if an individual marmoset finds itself in an
exposed position (Martins Bezerra and Souto 2008).
4. Self-scratching
Self-scratching has been described as a stress-associated
behavior for primates, including marmosets (Bassett et al.
2003).
5. Escape
An escape involved the subject rattling and gnawing on
the closed door (a gray plastic panel) on top of the
experimental compartment in an attempt to leave the test
situation.
6. Not taking offered food
Not taking offered food was a subject’s refusal to
retrieve the cricket from the E’s hand who offered it as a
reward in the end of phase 1. From previous experiments,
all subjects were used to retrieve rewards from an E’s
hand.
The definitions of the dependent variables are
summarized in Table 2. The variables tail-brush (1)
and escape (5) were measured as states. The beginning
and end of a tail-brush state were determined by vis-
ible brushing or de-brushing of the tail, captured as a
quick change (within a few seconds) in the degree of
its piloerection. The duration of an escape state was
delimited by the visible and audible start and end of
the rattling and gnawing on the door at the top of the
experimental compartment. The variables tsik calls (2),
egg calls (3), self-scratching (4) and not taking offered
food (6) were treated as events. Every individual egg
and tsik vocalization was coded as an event. Self-
scratching was defined as an event of the subject using
a hand or foot to scratch a part of its own body. Not
taking the offered food was recorded as a single
occurrence of the subject not retrieving the offered
food from E’s hand. The durations for the two state
variables were measured in seconds and calculated as
percentages of the total duration of phase 1. Events
were calculated as relative frequencies by dividing the
absolute frequency of the behavior by the total dura-
tion of phase 1.
Dependent measures during phase 2
Task participation was defined as the total number of trials
the subjects completed in the visible and invisible dis-
placement test.
The subjects’ performance in the cognitive test was live-
coded by the E who noted each of the subject’s choices as
correct, wrong or non-choice and later verified these
choices based on the video clips. Furthermore, we coded
from the video clips for each trial in which a subject par-
ticipated, whether the subject had actually seen the baiting
and displacement or not, based on its head and body ori-
entation during the manipulation of the experimenter. If the
subject’s head and eyes were oriented in a way that the E’s
hand and the containers were in its line of sight at the
moment of the baiting and the transposition, a trial was
coded as seen by the subject.
Task performance was calculated separately for each
test and defined as the number of correct choices in all
trials in which the subjects had paid attention to the pre-
sentation and therefore actually seen where the food was
hidden or displaced.
Reliabilities and statistical data analysis
In order to assess inter-rater reliability of behavioral coding
for phase 1, and of the task performance and attention in
phase 2, 20 % of the 56 video clips were coded by a second
rater. Krippendorff’s alpha coefficient was calculated for
each dependent variable (Hayes and Krippendorff 2007;
Krippendorf 2011). For the emotional reactivity variables
from phase 1, alpha was generally high: egg calls
a(12) = 0.99, tail-brush a(12) = 0.91, tsik calls
a(12) = 0.97 and escape a(12) = 0.99. For phase 2, the
cognitive task, all choices and non-choices were double-
checked based on the video recordings. Correspondence
between initially noted choices and double-checked choi-
ces was a 100 %. Krippendorff’s alpha for the subjects’
attention in the first object permanence test was
a(72) = 1.00 for both the first and second object perma-
nence tasks.
The dependent variables from phase 1 were first sub-
jected to a principal component analysis (PCA without
rotation) that established whether they represented the
same or different dimensions of the subjects’ emotional
reactivity. However, self-scratching and not taking offered
food were not used in this PCA owing to floor effects. Self-
scratching was an extremely rare behavior, and with the
exception of two male subjects who refused to accept the
food from one unfamiliar experimenter, all subjects
accepted the offered reward from all four experimenters.
The principal components extracted from the PCA were
used as explanatory factors in subsequent general linear
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mixed models (GLMMs) with task participation, task per-
formance and attention, as response variables, using the
Standard Least Squares option and the restricted maximum
likelihood method (REML). In all models, experimenter
nested in experimenter group and subject were included as
random effects. All statistical analyses were conducted
using the software Jmp 10. We used a significance level of
a = .05 for all statistical tests, and all tests were two-tailed.
Is there individual variation in emotional reactivity toward
different experimenters? In order to answer the first
question of whether the extent of the subjects’ emotional
reactivity differed when confronted with familiar versus
unfamiliar experimenters, a separate GLMM was con-
ducted for each of the two components resulting from the
PCA (i.e., arousal and avoidance, see below).
Do individual differences in emotional reactivity affect the
subjects’ participation in the cognitive task? To address
the second question of whether elevated emotional reac-
tivity (phase 1) influenced a subject’s motivation to par-
ticipate in the cognitive task (phase 2), we ran GLMMs for
the whole object permanence task with the relative number
of completed trials out of twelve as response variable. As
fixed effects, we included arousal (as measured by factor 1
of the PCA), avoidance (as measured by factor 2), subject’s
sex, and their univariate and bivariate combinations with
and without interactions. The best model was identified
based on the lowest value of the Akaike information cri-
terion, controlled for small sample sizes (AICc, Hurvich
and Tsai 1989). This model selection approach was chosen
to account for the limited number of subjects.
Furthermore, we tested whether the extent of a sub-
ject’s emotional reactivity affected how attentive it was
during the baiting procedure in the first object perma-
nence test and during the baiting and the transposition
procedure of the cups in the second test. Therefore, we
ran a second series of nine GLMMs with the same fixed
and random effects as above, but the response variable
was the number of trials a subject had attended to divi-
ded by all participated trials.
Do individual differences in emotional reactivity affect the
subjects’ performance in the cognitive task? We ana-
lyzed the third question of whether high emotional reac-
tivity toward the experimenter and the test situation
influenced the subjects’ performance in the cognitive task
by running several GLMMs separately for each of the two
object permanence tests.
Analogous to question 2, we ran two series of nine
different GLMMs all of which included the fixed effects
subject’s sex, arousal, avoidance and their interactions.
Furthermore, we used two different response variables to
elucidate how the subjects’ attention to the test procedure
influenced their performance, i.e., the total number of
correct trials divided by the number of participated trials
and the total number of correct trials a subject had attended
to divided by all attended trials.
Results
Two independent dimensions of emotional reactivity
The PCA on the four emotional reactivity measures in
phase 1 (Table 2) revealed two independent dimensions
with eigenvalues greater than 1 (2.167 and 1.186). Three
dependent variables loaded highly on the first factor that
explained 54.2 % of the total variance in the dependent
measures: egg calls (0.857), tail-brush (0.840) and tsik calls
(0.837). Since all three variables represented audible and
visible behavioral signs of arousal, the first factor was
named ‘‘arousal.’’ The fourth variable, escape, loaded very
highly (0.954) on the second factor which explained
29.7 % of the total variance and was named ‘‘avoidance’’
(see Table 3). To avoid collinearity issues, the two emo-
tional reactivity factors, arousal (factor 1) and avoidance
(factor 2), were used for all further statistical analyses.
Individual variation in emotional reactivity
A first GLMM with the response variable arousal and the
fixed effects experimenter group and subject’s sex, and
Table 2 Definitions of the emotional reactivity measures
Dependent variable Measurement level Coded behavior
1 Tail-brush State/duration Visible change in piloerection of the tail
2 ‘‘Tsik’’ vocalizations Event/frequency Every individual call of a sequence was counted as a vocalization
3 ‘‘Egg’’ vocalizations Event/frequency Every individual call of a sequence was counted as a vocalization
4 Self-scratching Event/frequency Using a hand or leg to scratch a part of its own body
5 Escape State/duration Rattling and gnawing on the door at the top of the experimental compartment
6 Not taking offered food Single occurrence yes/no No attempt to manually retrieve the offered cricket from the experimenter’s hand
Four dependent variables (1, 2, 3 and 5) were included in the statistical analysis, while the other two dependent variables (4 and 6 in italics) were
excluded owing to floor effects
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their interaction, showed no significant main effect of
experimenter group on subjects’ arousal [F(1,2) = 12.88,
p = .070)], although there was a trend for the subjects’
arousal to be more pronounced when confronted with
unfamiliar as opposed to familiar experimenters. There
was, however, a significant effect of the subjects’ sex
F(1,12) = 7.28, p = .019. A post hoc Student’s t test
revealed that male marmosets showed significantly higher
arousal than females t(12) = 2.70, p = .019 (Fig. 2).
Furthermore, the interaction between experimenter group
and subjects’ sex was highly significant F(1,38) = 8.55,
p\ .006. A Tukey HSD post hoc test revealed that male
marmosets showed significantly more emotional arousal
when confronted with unfamiliar experimenters (least
square mean = 1.56, SE = 0.41) than with familiar ones
(LS mean = -0.22, SE = 0.41) and than female subjects
with both unfamiliar (LS mean = -0.44, SE = 0.41) and
familiar experimenters (LS mean = -0.90; SE = 0.41).
A second GLMM with avoidance as response variable
revealed a strong trend in the same direction. Again, there
was no significant effect of experimenter group
F(1,2) = 0.31, p = .634 but a significant effect of the
subjects’ sex F(1,12) = 4.86, p = .048. Male marmosets
generally showed more avoidance behavior than females
t(12) = 2.21, p =.048 (Fig. 2). However, although there
was a trend for more pronounced escape behavior of male
marmosets in response to the unfamiliar experimenter
group, the interaction between experimenter group and
subject’s sex was not significant F(1,38) = 1.42, p = .241.
Emotional reactivity influences the subjects’
participation
Participation in the object permanence task
The best model to explain the effect of the subjects’
emotional reactivity on their overall participation in the
object permanence task (both displacement tests) was the
one that included subject’s sex as the only fixed effect
(model 1, see table S1 in the supplementary material). In
this model, a subject’s sex had a highly significant effect on
the number of completed trials F(1,12) = 41.16,
p\ .0001. However, the model that additionally included
arousal showed nearly identical performance (model 4,
DAICc = 1.840, see table S1). In this model, both effects,
a subject’s sex [F(1,13.2), p\ .002] and arousal [F(1,36.6)
p\ .024], significantly influenced participation in the test.
A Student’s t test [t(12) = 6.42, p\ .0001] revealed that
male subjects completed significantly fewer trials (LS
Mean = 0.46, SE = 0.09) than females (LS Mean = 0.99,
SE = 0.09), who in fact all participated in all six trials of
the visible displacement test and in most trials of the
invisible displacement test (Fig. 3a).
The relatively small difference between the two models
(DAICc = 1.836) indicates that both variables, a subject’s
sex and its arousal, explain the individual variance in
participation equally well. Their interaction was not sig-
nificant (model 5, table S1).
Attention in the object permanence task
The best model for the response variable attention, the
number of seen trials out of all participated trials, was the
Fig. 2 Effect of a subject’s sex on its emotional reactivity. The dark
gray bars represent the subjects’ mean arousal (as measured by factor
1 of the PCA), the light gray bars their mean avoidance levels (as
measured by factor 2). The two left bars represent female subjects
($$), the two right bars males (##). Note: To better visualize the
values that resulted from the PCA, they were transformed by adding a
factor of 5 so that all values appeared greater than zero
Table 3 Two-factor structure of the subjects’ emotional reactivity:
arousal and avoidance behavior
Dependent variable F1 arousal F2 avoidance
Egg calls 0.857 -0.287
Tail-brush 0.840 0.360
Tsik calls 0.837 -0.251
Escape attempts 0.161 0.954
Loadings of the four dependent variables on the two extracted prin-
cipal components (factors). Both stress-related vocalizations and
piloerection of the tail (tail-brush) loaded highly on the first factor,
arousal, which explained 54.2 % of the total variation. The subjects’
attempts to leave the situation loaded highly on the second factor,
avoidance, which explained a further 29.7 % of the total variation
High factor loadings are indicated in bold
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one which only included the fixed effect arousal
F(1,31.3) = 30.94, p\ .0001 (model 2, AICc = 40.780,
see table S2 in the supplementary material). Highly aroused
subjects saw the test procedure in fewer participated trials
than subjects with low arousal. Moreover, although there
was no significant effect of avoidance on overall attention,
avoidant subjects were less attentive in the first object
permanence test F(1,21.54) = 9.16, p = .006 (Fig. 4a).
Emotional reactivity does not influence cognitive test
performance
Performance in test 1 visible displacement
When using the subjects’ uncorrected performance as
response variable, i.e., the number of correct trials of all
participated trials in the first test, the best of the nine
models based on the lowest Akaike information criterion
was the one that included avoidance as the only fixed effect
F(1,38.1) = 7.29, p = .010 (model 3, AICc = 18.035, see
table S3a in the supplementary material). Highly avoidant
subjects, who were predominantly males, made fewer
correct choices than less avoidant ones (Fig. 4b).
When using corrected performance as response vari-
able, i.e., the number of correct trials in which the subject
saw the baiting of the cup, the best model was still the one
with the fixed effect avoidance F(1,36.01) = 2.40,
p = .130 (model 3, AIC = 20.090, see table S3b) but a
subject’s avoidance level no longer had a significant effect
on its performance (Fig. 4c). Moreover, the model that
only included subject’s sex as fixed effect (model 1,
DAICc = 0.315 see table S3b) and the model including
arousal only (model 2, DAICc = 1.876, see table S3b) can
be considered as equivalent based on their DAICc values
lower than 2. None of these effects were significant.
Performance in test 2 invisible displacement
When we used the uncorrected performance as response
variable, the best model included only subject’s sex (model
Fig. 3 A subject’s sex and emotional arousal affected its participa-
tion but not its performance in the object permanence task. Mean
percentages of (a) participated trials of a subject in the object
permanence task, and (b) correct trials in the second test, invisible
displacement, corrected for attention. A subject’s sex is indicated by
its gender symbol ($ = female, # = male)
Fig. 4 Emotional avoidance affected a subject’s attention but not its
performance in the first object permanence test, visible displacement.
Shown is the effect of a subject’s avoidance levels on (a) the mean
percentage of trials it paid attention to, (b) its uncorrected
performance: the mean percentage of correct of all participated trials,
and (c) its corrected performance: the mean percentage of correct
trials it paid attention to in the visible displacement test. A subject’s
sex is indicated by its gender symbol ($ = female, # = males)
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1, AICc = -4.251, see table S4 in the supplementary
material). Male subjects tended to perform more poorly
than females, but this effect was not significant
F(1,13.85) = 1.90, p = .189.
When we used the corrected performance as response
variable and thus controlled for attention, the best model
was, as for test 1, the one including avoidance as single
fixed effect F(1,18.95) = 1.05, p = .318 (model 3, see
table S4). However, the two models that only included sex
(model 1, DAIC = 1.319) and arousal (model 2,
DAIC = 0.368) resembled it closely (see table S4). None
of these effects were significant (Fig. 3b).
Discussion
The aim of this study was to quantitatively assess whether
and how a subject’s emotional reactivity toward an
experimenter and the test situation impacts participation
and performance in a cognitive task.
In a two-phase experiment conducted in a single session,
we quantified the extent of emotional reactivity of common
marmosets toward four different experimenters. We then
assessed whether and how emotional reactivity affected the
subjects’ participation and performance in a subsequent
object permanence task. To maximize variation in the sub-
jects’ emotional reactivity, we confronted subjects with two
groups of experimenters whom we expected to elicit high
variation in emotional reactivity, two male experimenters,
who were complete strangers to the subjects, versus two
familiar female experimenters. In the first phase of the
experiment, the experimenters performed an identical stan-
dardized sequence of behavioral actions in front of the sub-
jects. We found considerable variability in the subjects’
spontaneous emotional response as measured by four
behavioral indicators that represented two independent
dimensions of emotional reactivity, arousal and avoidance.
The marmosets behaviorally expressed high arousal by
showing piloerection of the tail and emitting two distress-
related vocalizations, whereas avoidance was expressed by
attempts to leave the experimental situation. Overall and in
accordance with our expectation, male subjects were more
emotionally aroused than females when confronted with the
experimenters, in particular with unfamiliar ones. They also
tended to try to avoid the situation more often than female
marmosets, independently from experimenter familiarity.
The extent of emotional reactivity during phase 1 had
affected the male subjects’ participation in the subsequent
object permanence task in phase 2, whereas the participa-
tion of females was largely unaffected. Moreover, mar-
mosets who were more emotionally reactive in phase 1
tended to be less attentive to the test procedure when they
eventually participated in the cognitive test.
In contrast to their participation, the subjects’ cognitive
performance in the object permanence task was not affec-
ted by emotional reactivity, given we controlled their
performance for whether they had had paid attention to the
experimental procedure or not. However, when not con-
trolling for attention, individuals who had shown more
attempts to leave the situation (avoidance) in phase 1 made
more mistakes. Together, the results suggest that individ-
uals who were more emotionally reactive in phase 1 were
less likely to be attentive to the task prior to making their
choice and made more mistakes. Thus, controlling for
attention is vital in particular for individuals who show
higher emotional reactivity. We conclude that in common
marmosets, emotional reactivity toward an experimenter
affects participation and attention but not performance in
cognitive tasks. An interesting direction for future studies
is to disentangle what factors are responsible for the higher
emotional reactivity of some individuals. Besides a sub-
ject’s sex, possible factors are its personality, its familiarity
with the experimenter, the experimenter’s gender, similar
personalities of both the subject and the experimenter, or a
combination of these factors.
In our study, male marmosets showed a stronger emo-
tional response, were less motivated to participate, com-
pleted fewer trials and were less likely to attend to the
presentation and experimental manipulation of the cups
and the reward. However, in the trials in which they did
participate and paid attention to the presentation and
manipulation of these stimuli, their cognitive performance
did not differ from their female conspecifics’ performance.
This result contrasts with the idea that female common
marmosets possess better cognitive abilities than males
(Yamamoto et al. 2004; Brown et al. 2010). Our results
suggest that these reported sex differences in cognitive
performance in marmosets are best understood in terms of
motivational and attentional sex differences, such as a
higher interest of female marmosets to work for food and
of male marmosets to remain vigilant to the environment
(see also Koenig 1998), rather than reflecting a true sex
difference in their cognitive abilities.
Our results have two implications for conducting
experimental tests with marmosets, and arguably non-
human primates in general. First, comparable results may
be achieved with different experimenters, even if subjects
vary individually in how they behaviorally respond to these
different experimenters. It is crucial, however, to control
for whether the subjects are attentive to the presentation
and manipulation of the experimental stimuli, because
particularly highly reactive individuals may participate in
the task without paying attention to it, perhaps in order to
quickly finish the experiment. Ideally, the experimenter
should obtain the subject’s full attention before starting a
test trial and closely attend to whether the subject stays
Anim Cogn (2015) 18:701–712 711
123
attentive during the whole test procedure. However, mon-
itoring a subject’s attention during testing can be difficult,
because the experimenter has to avoid to inadvertently give
visual cues to the subject and cannot look at it during the
actual test trial. Therefore, it is vital to determine from
video recordings for every trial whether the subject had
been fully attentive or not, and to correct its performance
accordingly.
The second implication is that excluding highly reactive
animals from testing does not necessarily bias the results.
In fact, the alternative explanation of the trait anxiety effect
in macaques (Toxopeus et al. 2005), i.e., that the adverse
effect of trait anxiety on cognitive performance results
from attentional biases rather than cognitive ability per se,
is supported by the present set of findings. Likewise, our
results are consistent with the ones obtained by Morton
et al. (2013) who basically showed a participation effect
rather than a truly cognitive one.
Based on our findings, we suggest that differences in
emotional reactivity do not necessarily have an impact on
cognitive performance. Thus, it is justifiable both to use
different experimenters and to exclude very highly aroused
and unmotivated subjects from testing. However, obser-
vable behavioral indicators of elevated emotional arousal
should sensitize the experimenter to evaluate an individual
subject’s attentional state prior to and during cognitive
testing.
Acknowledgments We thank Prof. Carel van Schaik for discussion,
Dr. Karin Isler and Christa Finkenwirth for statistical advice, Caroline
Jordan for the graphic implementation of Fig. 1, and our animal
keepers, Heinz Galli and Thomas Bischof, for help with the prepa-
ration of the experimental room prior to this study. We also thank two
anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on the initial
manuscript. The study was funded by the Swiss National Science
Foundation (project number: 310030_130383). It was performed
under guidelines established by the National Veterinary Office of
Switzerland and licensed to be performed by the Veterinary Office of
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